

An analysis of the media climate in Alaska, leading up to and immediately following the Nov. 2004 general elections, specifically regarding Proposition 2, to legalize and regulate marijuana.

Mariann Garner-Wizard, Organizational Consultant
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Introduction. The campaign for Proposition 2 in Alaska took place within an exciting and unique political milieu. In addition to the majority Republican Party and hopeful Democrats, Alaska boasts semi-viable Libertarian, Green, Moderate Republican and Alaska Independent parties, and recognizes both independent and undeclared voters as separate categories. Among these, Libertarians played a large role in getting Prop. 2 on the ballot, and in earlier marijuana-related campaigns in Alaska. The Green Party, while opposing the drug war and specifically supporting Prop. 2, was not directly involved in the petition effort. The founder and leader of the state's Moderate Republicans supported Prop. 2 and participated in the campaign, but was not on the Steering Committee. There was no official support of Prop. 2 by any political party, in fact, nor was any sought, nor endorsement from any labor, community, or civic organization.

Alaskans for Peace & Justice, in Anchorage, independently offered more than one evening of film and discussion on the legalization question, with strong support from members and attendees. Howard Wooldridge, Media Director of Law Enforcement Against Prohibition (1. <http://leap.cc>), a retired Michigan State Trooper, came to Alaska and spoke to groups and the media about harms of the drug war, even though the campaign proper officially refused to associate itself with LEAP's message.

Many supporters of Prop. 2 were, in fact, not welcome in the new campaign. Excess baggage from a similar 2000 proposition, roundly criticized for having "gone too far" in suggesting that drug war victims be compensated and marijuana prisoners released, caused a backlash against some individuals, and, unfortunately, *issues* which had led that effort. Specifically, a decision was made to downplay industrial hemp in 2004, although the title of the initiative contained the word, along with "cannabis" and "marijuana". In the course of this research, in over 700 references, only two instances were found when hemp was mentioned by Prop. 2 spokespersons, and two when it was mentioned by detractors. There is no HEMP code in these pages. This disassociation "orphaned" many activists who had been educated on the virtues of hemp in 2000 and faithfully extolling them ever since; these supporters were effectively silenced in 2004 by the new campaign's decision that hemp was at best irrelevant and at worst a reminder of "unprofessional" conduct in the past. Findings on the potential of hemp industry in Alaska in the campaign's economic analysis (2. Bates, S., Boreal Economic Analysis & Research, Fairbanks, AK. *The Economic Implications of Marijuana Legalization in Alaska*. Alaskans for Rights & Revenues, Anchorage, AK. 2004) were de-emphasized in the final report, and in discussions with the media about it. Distressingly to this writer, in polling undecided voters on responses to various issues early in the campaign, and despite assurances to the contrary, no hemp (non-drug uses of cannabis) question was included by the contractors; thus, no baseline information was collected on the topic.

Alaskans face oil drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Reserve and see the effects of global warming, caused largely by fossil fuel consumption, on their fragile and unique environment. Hemp biomass fuels are a reasonable and increasingly attractive conservation option, yet this position is barely being articulated within the legalization community, and not at all, that can be seen, within the much larger environmental community. Hemp will be a vital part of any lasting legalization victory in Alaska, creating an economic stake in this useful plant for many who are uninterested in its recreational uses.

Marijuana's illegality itself was central to the climate in which the campaign was waged. Even in Alaska, where the state Constitution's privacy clause has been repeatedly ruled to protect adult marijuana use in the home, a history of recriminalization efforts and constant attacks by the State government has left most marijuana users there as wary as those in the Lower 48 of being publicly identified with the herb. This issue is fundamental to the legalization movement in the U.S. as a whole. All too often, the movement fails to gain the open support of the middle-class majority of marijuana users, and attracts a few too many supporters who are too young, too incoherent, too strange in appearance and/or demeanor, or who have histories which do not bear close scrutiny. Political activists who have learned the ropes in traditional candidate or issue-oriented campaigns are seldom impressed with the marijuana movement's ability to function in a coordinated, intelligent, proactive manner; it is almost as though the dread "amotivational syndrome", thought to affect some marijuana users, actually affects our political manifestations, regardless of many individuals' staunch professionalism, energy, commitment, and outright valor. The Prop. 2 campaign recognized this problem and made a serious effort to overcome it; the relative success of this effort is discussed below.

In 2005, not only was there a hotly-contested national election for the Presidency of the United States, but a super-heated Alaska Senatorial campaign was waged between allegations of nepotism and ultra-liberalism. Other state and local races created full ballots, rounded out by four controversial initiatives, of which Prop. 2 was only one. In addition, partly because of the previously mentioned nepotism charges and partly because of other gaps in good government, petitions were being circulated by third parties and independents for the impeachment of Governor Murkowski and/or other state officials, whose misdeeds continued unabated throughout the election, often directed specifically towards Prop. 2. There was no connection between these petition campaigns and the Prop. 2 effort.

It is the author's philosophy, developed in community and political organizing and media work in many milieus, that supporters of a proposition or candidate, although their support may be based upon widely differing foundations, may be brought to speak with united voices through a process of discussion, education, criticism and self-criticism, and that those who refuse to learn from the history of their own endeavors are doomed to repeat them. My position as an "Outsider", brought in very late to work on the Prop. 2 campaign, under circumstances which were less than ideal, did not allow me to help the effort much before Election Day, but did afford me a unique position to observe, document, and learn from a campaign in progress. It is in gratitude for that opportunity, and in hope that the data and observations contained herein will prove useful to the legalization movement in Alaska and the United States, that this work is offered.

Summary. A sample of media references from pre-campaign, campaign, and post-campaign periods was analyzed for content and matched with both external and internal events which affected the electoral outcome for Prop. 2. Results are charted and graphed, and connections between various themes, and their relative significance, are presented. Finally, an analysis is made of key issues which must be addressed by pro-legalization forces in Alaska in order to positively affect media and public perceptions and presentations of their position. Very broadly, these are: negative stereotypes vs. wholesome images, medical/physiological concerns, cost v. benefits of prohibition and legalization, states' rights v. federal prerogatives, and issues of privacy and adult rights.

Purpose. The purpose of this analysis was to obtain an accurate and useful understanding of the issues which were most decisive in determining the outcome for Ballot Measure 2. Before the campaign began in earnest, in September, 2004, there appears to have been little effort by advocates to systematically monitor Alaskan media, other than the three major newspapers (and those incompletely), for news and opinion which might shape and reflect attitudes toward the measure. During the campaign, an effort was made to inform staff and steering committee members of media contacts and mentions; however,

this was spottier than was realized at the time, as became apparent during the present research. After the election, in obtaining copies of newspaper articles referenced during the campaign but not received, manual searches in the Anchorage Public Library revealed a wealth of additional articles about the campaign, as well as other events which impacted the climate in which it was waged. A series of Internet searches ultimately produced a broad sample of newspaper articles from the 13 months preceding Election Day; that is, beginning in October 2003, a period during which opportunity existed when Measure 2 advocates, having completed a successful petition drive to place the initiative on the ballot, might have sought to influence the media climate, even while fighting the State's attempts to disallow the petition through the courts.


In addition, news articles and opinion appearing for 30 days after the election, through Dec. 2, 2004, were reviewed, in order to provide a glimpse of public perceptions of the outcome, and especially of issues which are most likely to be factors in future marijuana-related electoral activity in Alaska.

Methodology. At the beginning of any political campaign, some issues are already present, to greater or lesser degree, in the public consciousness, and others arise during the course of the campaign. In most instances, such themes are double-edged swords, with each side presenting its own interpretation of selected data; if this were not so, these would not be issues of contention. Barring outside events, as the campaign progresses, with issues debated and discussed by opposing sides, there is an increase in public awareness which takes place simply because an election is being held and debate has been joined. A graph showing some typical increases in awareness is shown as an example (3. Figure 1). Not all issues fare equally. Some are of insufficient interest to the public or the press to rate much mention, and will not significantly affect the outcome of the election. Others, through the stimulus of events which are not part of the actual campaign, either pro or con, or through effective campaigning by one or the other side, may increase their share of public awareness at a higher-than-average rate. Issues which most dominate the public discussion, and especially those which increase in importance over the course of the campaign, are most likely to affect undecided voters, and hence, close contests.

1. *The Sample.* The study sample included 228 (4. 35 from Oct., 2003 - Sept. 7, 2004; 153 from Sept. 8 - Nov. 2; and 40 from Nov. 3 - Dec. 2) unique media references, both print and electronic. Of these, 166, nearly 73%, made direct reference to the proposition. An Internet search was made for each of 33 Alaska publications, and their archives, if available, for the study period. Nineteen Alaska publications are represented in the sample, as well as national and regional news sources, a small group of radio and television stations, and Internet news sources. A complete list of sources, and the number of references from each, is included (5. Chart 1. Some articles appeared in more than one publication; these are shown separately in this list, for a total of 236 references, but these "repeaters" were not coded separately).

2. *Coding the Sample.* To the extent possible, each reference was coded for its mention of themes or issues which emerged during the campaign, whether the reference favored or opposed Prop. 2. For example, a relatively minor issue which emerged in the campaign was the degree to which marijuana legalization would attract visitors to Alaska. On the one hand, this was cast positively as a new draw for "Tourism" (T), which is vital to the Alaskan economy (6. Bates, *op., cit.*). On the other hand, it was cast negatively as an attractant for undesirable "Hordes of Hippies" (H), who were predicted to swarm to the state to smoke dope should the initiative pass. Thus, in coding the sample, mention of either view earned an H/T code. If an article mentioned both positive and negative arguments for the issue, it earned two H/T codes. Also, one phrase might, in context, generate two different codes; e.g., a letter might state that marijuana use affects work habits negatively, earning a "Worker/Job-Related Issues"

Figure 1.
Typical Media Distribution, Final Eight Weeks of Campaign



In this example, Issue 1 is a consistent performer for one or both sides of the debate; this is the hot topic throughout. Issues 2 and 3 perform at the mode, gradually increasing over the course of the campaign. Issue 4 peaks suddenly, perhaps as a result of an external event, then falls off rapidly and seems to have little significance in the outcome. However, see Issue 6, which flares up when Issue 4 peaks, then outperforms other issues to play a decisive role, along with Issue 1. It may be related to Issue 4, and may provide a transubstantiation of issues which is more palatable to public image-shapers than Issue 4. Issue 5 stops and starts and simply never amounts to a hill of beans.

Level at beginning of campaign:

- Issue 1
- Issue 2
- Issue 3
- Issue 4
- Issue 5
- Issue 6

code (WI); if it referred to marijuana users as "stoners", "potheads", etc., it also was coded "Stereotypes v. Public Image" (S/I). Eventually, fifteen codes covered the broad themes of the campaign as found in the public record. A list of all codes and the ground each was made to cover follows (7. Chart 2).

Articles which made only neutral statements concerning the proposition were not coded. Other references were not coded because complete information on their content was unavailable. Nor are these 228 references exhaustive; in particular, radio and television coverage of the campaign and related stories is only sketchily recorded.

Chart 1.

Sources, Number of References per Source

75	Anchorage Daily News (AnchDN)	2	Capital City Weekly (Juneau)
31	Fairbanks Daily News-Miner (FDNM)	2	KTVF-TV , Channel 11 (Fairbanks)
22	Anchorage Press (AnchPRS)	2	Marijuana Policy Report (Washington, D.C.)
15	Peninsula Clarion (Kenai)		
13	Juneau Empire	1	Anchorage Chronicle
6	KTUU-TV , Channel 2; Ch. 2 on-line (Anchorage)	1	The Bar Rag (Alaska Bar Association)
5	Ketchikan Daily News	1	Washington Times (Washington, D.C.)
5	Frontiersman ; Frontiersman.com (Wasilla)	1	KAKM-TV (Anchorage)
3	Alaska Star (Eagle River)	1	MS-NBC (cable television)
3	Kodiak Daily Mirror	1	Stateline.org
3	" Voice of the Times " (Anchorage)	1	Republican Party on-line
3	Homer News	1	KSKO 870 AM (McGrath radio)
3	APRN 91.1; 90.3 FM (statewide radio)	1	KFXE , Channel 7 (Fairbanks television)
2	Skagway News	1	Associated Press (unattributed otherwise)
2	Sun Star (University of Alaska, Fairbanks)	1	AlterNet (on-line news and opinion)
2	Chilkat Valley News (Haines)	1	Reuters
2	Fox National News (cable television); Fox News On-line	1	"Marijuana Times" (Ketchikan) *
2	Northern Light (University of Alaska, Anchorage)	1	Los Angeles Times (Los Angeles, CA)
2	Turnagain Times (Girdwood)	1	CNN On-line
2	Talkeetna Good Times	1	CounterPunch (on-line news and opinion)
2	" Ketchikan station "; "Ketchikan radio"	1	Houston Chronicle (Houston, TX)
2	KJNP (North Pole radio)	1	KUDO 1080 (Anchorage radio)
2	USA Today; USA Today On-line	1	KFAR 660 AM (Fairbanks radio)
		1	KENI 650 (Anchorage radio)
		1	" Channel 15 " (probably a cable channel)
		1	KIMO-TV , Channel 13 (Anchorage)
		1	KTVA-TV , Channel 11 (Anchorage)

* although nominally published in Ketchikan, this publication's contents originated in Washington, D.C., hence it is not shown in boldface, as are the Alaskan media sources.

Internet searches after the election were only partially successful, as some Alaska papers do not publish on-line, and, of those which do, many have limited or no online archives, and others charge for access. Numerous letters, in particular, as well as "News from Southeast" items, which may have referred to Prop. 2 or related matters, appeared in a search of the **Anchorage Daily News** (**AnchDN**) on-line archives but were not accessible through a direct search of the newspaper. Since an archives search reveals only the first letter published each day, and the Southeast news not at all, it was decided to forego the expense of essentially unknown archived items. Similarly, **Fairbanks Daily News-Miner's** (**FDNM**) archives reveal numerous police reports, and stories of violence against women, where marijuana (8. "Marijuana" was the primary search term used, far more productive than searching for Prop. 2 by name) is mentioned, but it was not within the parameters of this study to examine every instance of reported "marijuana crime" in Alaska.

Other notable omissions from the database are most of the pro- and con- TV and radio ads, as well as Prop. 2 press releases and mail pieces. (9. To dissect the media and voter education strategies employed by the campaign in its own presentations is generally beyond the scope of this analysis, although the outcome, to some degree, speaks for itself: 44.15% of Alaskans who cast a vote on Prop. 2 approved it, the largest percentage ever to vote for marijuana legalization in a U.S. election; this in a state carried at nearly 60% by an incumbent drug warrior President. If the problems which affected Prop. 2 can be understood and overcome, it seems entirely possible that a victorious legalization campaign may yet be waged in Alaska.) However, Prop. 2 ads were themselves news; thus, their effect can be at least partially evaluated by media comment. In exceptions, the first pro-Prop. 2 television ad is included in the sample, as are print ads

In the period Oct., 2003 - Nov. 2, 2004, 699 codes were assigned, with 102 from the "run-up" period before the campaign ad launch on Sept. 8. For the period Nov. 3 - Dec. 2, 2004, 75 codes were added, for a study total of 774. Codes were not pre-selected, although many campaign themes and issues could have been identified at the outset. However, rather than setting up an *a priori* code for youth-related issues, the first mention of "Youth and Marijuana" in the sample generated the code (Y). Codes may sometimes overlap, as those for "Youth and Marijuana " and for "Crime, Including Youth Crime" (C/YC). Others may be seen most revealingly as subsets of other issues. [10. While the H/T, WI, and "Driving Under the Influence" (D) themes are each discrete and have a particular effect and appeal, all may also be seen as sub-sets of the larger S/I conflict. When originally coding the issues, these were four completely separate themes; it was only when the pattern of their interaction could be seen that it was decided to also view these four issues conglomerately as "All S/I" (AS/I); discussed further in Findings.]

Assignment of a code does not mean that particular phrases or words were used in the article; merely that an issue is raised, directly or indirectly, by the writer or a source. Only three codes appear in the references for every phase of the campaign (for "State Officials ", SO; " Costs v. Benefits", C/B; and S/I issues), but all 15 were present to some degree in the pre-campaign "run-up" period.

In this study, the mathematical mode(s) of code frequency indicates the "typical" level of awareness ("buzz") for the period, with issues earning fewer codes having less "buzz" (a.k.a. "legs"), than those earning more. Frequency of theme appearance was compared in several ways, in order to assess relative influence within the overall media climate. This data, showing where and when issues joined, diverged, peaked, and waned, is presented in charts and graphs in an Appendix, and the full database.

Chart 2.

Thematic/Issue Codes

Y = Youth & Marijuana. This code was assigned to any reference to use of marijuana by children or youth, or effects of marijuana on youth especially. Within the youth context, references to marijuana as a "gateway drug", as addictive, or as being dangerously potent, may also have been coded "Y".

C/YC = Crime, Including Youth Crime. Assigned to mention of crimes committed in pursuit of obtaining or using marijuana, while using marijuana, or while engaged in marijuana commerce, whether committed by or upon adults or youth, or both. The effects of legalization upon crime reduction, upon reallocating resources in order to better deter violent crime, or the economic and social costs of marijuana-related crimes, may also have been coded "C/YC".

MED = Medical. This code was used for references to medical use of cannabis, or to its physiological effects or supposed physiological effects. Unless specific to youth, references to marijuana as a "gateway drug", as addictive, or as dangerously potent, may also have been coded "MED". In addition,

statements by medical professionals, even if not medical or scientific opinions, were also coded here, as were references to scientific or medical credentials of spokespersons for or against Prop. 2.

SO = State Officials. This refers to all attempts by state officials to block or interfere with the democratic process – and to tie up Prop. 2's backers in essentially meaningless court activity rather than issue-oriented discussion – as well as to state and local officials speaking on the measure itself.

O\$ = Outside Money & Interests v. Alaskan Interests. References to funding and support received from outside Alaska, by both pro- and anti- forces, as well as to federal funds and projects upon which Alaska relies heavily, "Outside" businesses' eagerness or reluctance to locate in Alaska, and to Alaskan "independence" and or separatism, as well as comment from non-Alaskan supporters and opponents, are all coded "O\$".

FX = Effects on Families. The need for this code as separate from Y or C/B themes arose late in the study period and is discussed further in the Findings. It charts specific references to effects of marijuana use, marijuana and other drug use, and/or of marijuana prohibition, on families.

S/I = Stereotypes v. Image. A strong effort was made by Prop. 2 forces to present a respectable image to Alaskan voters, at least in part due to a backlash against a 2000 initiative which had lent itself all too readily to "stoner" stereotypes. This code includes all references to the respectable voices for Prop. 2 and their "professional" campaign, as well as to marijuana user stereotypes.

W/I = Worker/Job-Related Issues. One of three sub-codes related to the S/I theme's development, covering references ranging from the harmlessness relaxing with a joint at the end of the work day to liability issues for employers of marijuana users. In some cases, stereotyping language was used.

D = Driving Under the Influence. Another lesser, S/I-related theme. All references to the intersection of the reefer with the road. In some cases, stereotyping language was used.

H/T = "Hippie Hordes" v. Tourism. A third S/I-related area. References to the relative attractant or repellent effect of legal marijuana on bringing people to Alaska, and whether they would be desirable (solvent) or undesirable (poor and/or irresponsible). In some cases, stereotyping language was used.

C/B = Costs v. Benefits. Whether applied to prohibition or legalization, this code was given to all assessments of relative costs and benefits. Intended to identify primarily economic arguments, other areas, such as social costs, when discussed on a cost-benefit basis, may also have been coded "C/B".

F/SR = Federal Power v. States' Rights. This code identifies references to the response of the federal government should Prop. 2 pass, as well as statements by U.S. government officials concerning the issue, as well as assertions that Alaska has the right to make such decisions without federal interference. While somewhat related to the O\$ theme (see above), this is a more specific thread, and is further discussed in the text.

ODAT = Other Drugs, Alcohol, & Tobacco. References to marijuana use in conjunction with other drugs and/or alcohol, or of relative harms of other drugs, alcohol and/or tobacco *vis-a-vis* marijuana, are coded "ODAT". In addition, a few references to marijuana a precursor to specific other substance use may have been so coded.

Thematic/Issue Codes - continued

P/AR = Privacy & Adult Rights. References to Alaska's Constitutionally-protected privacy rights, to the concepts of adult rights and of individual rights, and to the misuse of privacy (or isolation) to commit bad acts all received this code.

DC/T = Drug Counseling & Testing. People who make a living from the side effects of prohibition played a prominent role in the defeat of Prop. 2. Drug counseling and treatment professionals were quoted on the same level as medical professionals by the press, and their pronouncements are coded here. Costs of drug treatment were also raised in the campaign and may also be coded "DC/T".

AS/I = All Stereotype v. Image Issues. S/I, H/T, D, and WI codes conglomerated.

While this coding may be criticized as subjective and arbitrary, in fact, every issue raised in the campaign is covered by the codes developed, and to the extent possible, issues are grouped only if they were linked in some way during the campaign.

This method treats all references, regardless of source or circulation, as equal in importance. Certainly, any article which appeared in one of the Anchorage papers would have been seen by many more people than any which appeared in, say, the **Chilkat Valley News**. However, opinions expressed in a small paper, or the tone of its reportage, are just as valid as indicators of statewide media climate as those in the largest daily, just as reports by professional journalists and citizen-penned letters and op-ed pieces are equally valuable in assessing the decision-making process in action. Our sample is heavily weighted toward the major papers and members of the working press. (11. 165 of 228 references, over 72%, are from the Anchorage, Fairbanks, and Juneau media. 138 are professional products of the newsroom, while 63 are from citizen voices; in the remainder of the sample, both professional and citizen voices participate, e.g., call-in radio shows.) It is believed that the relative distribution or influence of references sampled is not an issue. Alaska is the most "wired" state in the Union. Many of its residents read one or more Alaskan or "Outside" online news sources daily. Major stories which affected the campaign were rapidly known all over the state. In Alaska, the "bush telegraph" (a.k.a. "the grapevine") is very effective, due to the relatively small and close-knit population.

3. *Scoring the Critical Issues.*

Just after the end of the study period, legislation was introduced in Juneau to attempt to roll-back Alaskans' Constitutional protection for marijuana use in the home. If this is to be resisted, and if there is to be any further liberalization of Alaska's marijuana laws, it will be necessary to recognize legalizers' strongest suits, and to bring concerted attention to bear upon them.

To this end, those issues in which there is the strongest opportunity for public education and for improving the media climate were scored and compared for their respective positive and negative impact during the campaign. These include Medical (MED), C/B, Privacy & Adult Rights (P/AR), and Federal Power v. States' Rights (F/SR) issues. These findings, and particular points of interest for other issue groups, are discussed below.

Findings.

1. *The Run-up.* During the run-up period, until the ad launch of the campaign in Sept., 2004, there was no organized media strategy on the part of Prop. 2 advocates. On the other hand, leading opponents in Alaska and their national allies had staked out their issues and gained important support by May, 2004, when federal Drug Czar John Walters visited the state. No articles during the run-in were found which

quoted any sponsors of the petition drive, only their attorney, Ken Jacobus, who, during this time, with one exception, spoke only on legal issues and proceedings raised by the State's opposition to the ballot measure being certified. When an opportunity arose for a "point/counterpoint" exchange in the **AnchDN** with anti-drug warrior Wevley Shea, California Judge James Gray was asked (by whom, this researcher does not know) to write the pro-legalization view. This seems, in hindsight, a poor choice; despite Gray's persuasiveness, he is first and foremost an Outsider. (12. Gray's article is notable for including the phrase "civil liberties"; this may be the only time during the campaign that this wording was used.)

However, it is the C/YC stories involving marijuana in the run-up period (13. Sixteen of 102, over 15%, compared with the mode for the period: nine issues received between four and nine codes, with three receiving seven; for an average modal score of just over 6%) which, again in retrospect, received far too little attention from Prop. 2 forces. Outsiders involved with the campaign were largely unaware of this association, while the Alaskans, perhaps, simply accepted it as part of the milieu, as natural, and thus easy to take for granted, as mountain peaks seen daily.

In addition to distribution of issue codes, a pattern may be seen in the run-up period which characterized much subsequent reportage on Prop. 2: weak or vague arguments, or the occasional flippant remark, are quoted frequently from Prop. 2 supporters, over strong, clear, on-target remarks (note contrasting stories in **AnchDn** 10/15/03, and **Alaska Star**, 2/27/04, in which Jim Welch is quoted, vaguely on medical marijuana use in the **AnchDN** news story about Prop. 2, and succinctly and clearly on numerous subjects, including multiple sclerosis and his occasional marijuana use, in the **Star's** feature piece.) By contrast, opposition spokesmen were, more often than not, quoted "on-message". However, in a **Fox National News** piece (8/19/04), when Jacobus for the first time took on the role of teetotaling supporter as well as Republican attorney, after an hour of closely-reasoned discussion in which he gave the Fox reporter not one misstep, he was shown uttering only one jocular sentence (his only one!) when the piece aired. Attorney General Greg Renkes, also accorded one sentence, sounded very silly indeed, and the piece focused largely on images of anonymous people in Anchorage smoking dope, and some pretty medical plants being grown by initiative supporters.

Finally, while this study was hardly necessary in order to conclude that external events, essentially beyond the control of Prop. 2 organizers, played extremely important roles in determining the outcome of this campaign, it is interesting to note that the four most important types were foreshadowed clearly during the run-up:

- a) the State's attempts to keep Prop. 2 off the ballot, to skew public perception of its effects, and to siphon energy and resources (including press coverage) from the campaign into courtroom tactics;
- b) court decisions, both in Alaska and in Washington, D. C., which variously affected both the reality and the perception of marijuana's "legality" in Alaska under certain circumstances, and, in the federal cases, were reminders that Alaska does not have the "last word", at this time, on these choices;
- c) the delay or derailment of planned campaign activities due to unforeseen circumstances, leading to a lack of pro-Prop. 2 news; most notably, in the run-up period, an economic study (14. Bates, *op. cit.*) planned to be released immediately after Labor Day was held back due to the legal problems of the original author; [15. While some members of the then-still-formative Yes on 2 Steering Committee were aware of Bob Logan's arrest on bootlegging charges, and while Logan had made full disclosure to the Outside consultant who hired him to conduct the economic analysis, none had felt this important enough to discuss with major funders, other Steering Committee members, or staff, who learned of it by a tiny stroke of luck on the eve of the study's planned release, and, coincidentally, coverage of Logan's plea bargai (**FDNM** 9/1/04). The study, intended to turn the campaign to a discussion of relative Costs v. Benefits of prohibition and legalization (C/B), hurriedly re-written by another economist, Scott Bates, was released later; horribly, on the eve of more bad news. C/B issues figured at the modal level (7 of 102, just under 7%) in the run-up, and rose only slightly above the mode in Weeks Seven and Eight. Interestingly, there are 9 of 75 (12%) C/B codes in the post-election period; the second-highest of any single issue.] and

d) the perceived incidence of criminal violence, particularly youth violence associated with marijuana, was reinforced by the guilty verdict against Brandon Ling (**AnchDN** 8/5/04), a teen who killed his teenage neighbor after enticing her to sneak out late for some "free marijuana". This verdict, and the surrounding news coverage, was never discussed within the Prop. 2 campaign.

Things would only get worse.

2. *Week One, Sept. 8-Sept. 14.* Only eight codes were set for just five issues in the first week of the campaign. Of these, four, or 50%, are Ys; the first pro-Prop. 2 television ads, which began running during this week, occasioned this attention. These ads upset some Prop. 2 supporters. They portrayed teenagers smoking marijuana, in dark, stark settings, with an atonal sound track. Although a woman's voice and on-screen graphics discussed statistics on Alaska's teen marijuana use v. that in the Netherlands, and some of the costs of prohibition, many complained that they could not tell whether or not the ad favored the initiative, or they thought it was an anti-Prop. 2 ad, until the very end.

An important external event during this week earned three of the other four codes awarded (**FDNM** 9/14/04), and continued to gain in importance as its meaning was debated throughout the campaign: the Alaska Supreme Court refused to review an Appeals Court decision (*Noy*), thus affirming the 1975 *Ravin* decision as the law of the land. Opponents were quick to claim that Prop. 2 was thus "moot", and marijuana legal in Alaska; however, neither *Ravin* nor *Noy* provides for cannabis commerce, an integral part of Prop. 2's reach.

3. *Week Two, Sept. 15-Sept. 21.* Thirty-two codes were set for 13 issues. Two modal levels are seen, with three issues having four codes each and four issues having two codes each. Only S/I issues exceed these, with seven (just under 22%). It was during this week that Prop. 2's campaign spokesman, well-liked former State Corrections official and former State Representative Bill Parker, was named, and the campaign was formally launched with a lively, well-attended and widely reported open house in Anchorage. (16. Parker's role as campaign spokesman was cut short almost immediately, and before Bill was fully comfortable with his role, by the suicide of his eldest son. Interestingly, there was never any mention of Bill's connection with Prop. 2 in news of his son's death, nor of his son's death in news of Prop. 2; this restraint on the part of both the media and Prop. 2 opponents may be both a mark of the respect in which the Parker family is held and of some old-fashioned decency in the political climate of Alaska. Alaskans view each other, in some sense, as "family", and in this sad instance, the larger Alaskan family observed a respectful public silence, while in private grieving the Parkers' loss with them.)

Yet four of the S/I codes are from the decidedly stereotypical end of the scale, "in jokes" and phrases in headlines portraying marijuana users as lazy, dazed, and foolish. Sadly, this stereotype was reinforced by the appearance of a public invitation to the campaign launch *after* the party! In the same venue, the **Anchorage Press** (**AnchPRS**), the only paper to eventually endorse the proposition, the campaign dropped the ball on free ad space offered by the publisher, a situation which would not be rectified for some time. WorkSafe, Inc., the Anchorage-based drug testing company owned by anti-Prop. 2 spokesman Matthew Fagnani, on the other hand, was a regular **AnchPRS** advertiser.

Other Drugs, Alcohol & Tobacco issues (ODAT) made an odd appearance in Week Two (17. These two articles may not have appeared in the same campaign week; one is missing a date in our copy; however, they did appear within a week of each other), when **AnchDN** reprinted articles about two exotic ways to get high: khat, used in many Muslim countries but banned in the US, and an alcohol-delivery system which effectively "bypasses the liver"; both pieces, from the **Denver Post**, seemed to have no applicability to Alaska other than adding to fears of drugs in general. The khat article offered an opportunity for a self-serving, pious remark from the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) to the same effect.

Finally, the active opposition of then-Attorney General Greg Renkes is notable (Ch. 2, **KTUU-TV**), 9/16/04) and clearly improper if not outright illegal; this was not challenged by the campaign.

4. *Week Three, Sept. 22-Sept. 28.* Thirteen codes were set in eight issues. No important outside events occurred for the campaign. General sparring between pro- and con-spokesmen concentrated on C/YC issues (3 codes); ODAT (2), and S/I (2). However, a strong pro-Prop. 2 message did not emerge. Only one media opportunity (**AnchDN** 9/23/04) showcased proponents' strengths convincingly. Even before this article, however, the poor practice of Prop. 2 spokesmen being interviewed separately, rather than issuing a statement from all or being interviewed as a group, was established. Under these conditions, no useful criticism or self-criticism of spokesmen's effectiveness could take place.

5. *Week Four, Sept. 29-Oct. 5.* Twenty-seven codes were set in eleven issues. There is a distinct modal cluster, with four issues having three codes each. Only SO issues exceed the mode, at more than double the rate, with seven codes (not quite 26%). State officials launched a new offensive to skew Prop. 2's reception by (literally) "doctoring" the ballot language. Court action, when such shenanigans also affected other ballot measures, and the costly reprinting of ballots, dominated media coverage.

However, SO issues are basically a distraction from the "real" issues over which proponents and opponents grappled [although this particular tactic by the anti- forces fed both Y and Effects on Families (FX) concerns], and in this week plateau issues reached a level indicating, finally, one month from Election Day, growing public interest in Prop. 2. At three codes each, C/YC, Y, FX, and Outside Money & Influence v. Alaskan Interests (O\$) issues had gained a firm foothold in public awareness. For the *only* time during the study period, AS/I issues fell below the mode. C/YC, Y, and FX issues were boosted by the murder trial of Shane Harapat (**AnchDN** 9/29/04) and his parents; the Harapats had apparently known of and condoned both Shane's marijuana use and irresponsible gun use. Shane accidentally shot his best friend from childhood, and his parents went on trial with him. Two families were destroyed, and Shane's "pot pipes" and tie-dyed marijuana leaf flag with the words "Legalize It", were described to the jury as well as to the reading public. Almost unbelievably, this trial was not discussed by Prop. 2 leaders and had no clearly discernible effect upon it; less than a month later, external events would once again knock the campaign for a loop.

O\$ codes in this week are from **AnchPRS** articles and would not be thought to have had much if any negative effect, except that Keith Stroup of National NORML was quoted in a way which seemed to disparage Prop. 2; a later letter from Stroup did not really repair any damage from these remarks (**AnchPRS** 9/30-10/6/04).

6. *Week Five, Oct. 6-Oct. 12.* In this week, 50 codes were set in 14 issues. There are two distinct modal plateaus, with five issues having two codes each, and five issues with either four or five codes. However, O\$, with 15 codes (30%), three times the level of any other issue, dominated the week. Prop. 2's "enormous" outside funding was revealed, compared to tiny sums raised by opponents (whose APOC reports never satisfactorily accounted for visible expenditures). Although involving "outside" factors, this was not an issue external to the campaign or outside its influence. It was known in advance what the level of outside funding was likely to be; it was known what the response to news of that funding would likely be. The O\$ score is raised further by the fact that, of five letters supporting Prop. 2 in the week's **AnchPRS**, four were from outside Alaska. Also, at the end of this week, the **Washington Times** reported that Drug Czar John Walters and his team would campaign against marijuana initiatives in Alaska, Oregon, and Montana; while this clip was distributed to the Prop. 2 committee, it was not discussed, and in Week Six, campaigners once again played "catch-up".

In Week Five, Prop. 2 print ads debuted; these followed the design of earlier-introduced bumper stickers and proclaimed "PROTECT YOUR RIGHTS". Similar print ads were used throughout the campaign, with one exception (doctors and professionals ad, Week Eight). P/AR issues, along with some F/SR issues, were thought to resonate with this slogan, the only official slogan of the campaign. Overall, both issues ranked in the low plateau area. In the run-up period, P/AR issues are above the mode, and F/SR issues just below. Throughout the campaign, both remained at plateau level or below. Both remained at plateau level in the post-campaign period.

7. *Week Six, Oct. 13-Oct. 19.* Ninety-one codes were set in 15 issues. Again, SO issues with 13 codes (14%) and O\$ issues with 10 (just under 11%) dominated the discussion. Neither was among the themes which Prop. 2 supporters sought to emphasize. SO issues centered around the activities of Deputy Drug Czar Scott Burns, with Alaska's First Lady and various dignitaries, including local officials, in Anchorage and in Fairbanks/North Pole. Burns beat the drum for all of the anti- themes: Y, C/YC, and O\$ both through castigating Prop. 2 as the creature of Outside interests, and, in the next breath, threatening the loss of federal and military funds should Prop. 2 pass (**Channel 11** Fairbanks TV 10/14/04; **AnchDN** 10/14/04; **FDNM** 10/15/04)! In addition, he helped legitimize the low end S/I issues, joining police officials in saying that traffic accidents are caused by marijuana use (D) and that Prop. 2 would make Alaska "the Columbia of the North" (H/T; C/YC). For the remainder of the campaign, negative stereotypes, virtually unanswered, would push AS/I issues close to the top of the public consciousness. In this week, AS/I codes equal SO codes at 13 (14%). Week Six saw a resurgence of "stoner" jokes and puns; unfortunately, an error in Prop. 2's second round of television ads, while truly hilarious, earned two of these codes. (18. A study in contrasts to the earlier, much-criticized ads, these were bright, outdoorsy, wholesome, "Alaskan" pieces, referring to AK as the "last, best place", etc; however, the state's "last frontier" slogan somehow metamorphosed into Star Trek's "final frontier", leading **AnchDN** columnist Sheila Toomey to refer to the campaign, with some justification, as "spaced".)

For the first time, MED issues rose above the mode (five issues this week had six codes each), with nine codes (just under 10%). This is a mixed bag: doctors appearing with Burns and Murkowski, an article by Dr. Bob Johnson, Prop. 2's family physician on Kodiak Island; and an unfortunate quote from spokesman Dr. Tim Hinterberger on "worst-case medical scenarios"; on balance, the antis took the week. C/YC issues, which had previously lingered at or below modal levels except in low-key Week Three, jumped to fourth place, with eight codes (just under 9%), and Y issues also ranked above the mode with seven codes (over 7%); these are largely due to the Burns/Murkowski junket, which sparked a feeding frenzy of civic resolutions opposing Prop. 2.

Also in Week Six, F/SR issues picked up more steam, largely as a result of the dark spectre of federal displeasure, and P/AR issues began to be counterpoised to FX concerns; see **FDNM** letter, 10/16/04 for an example of this development.

8. *Week Seven, Oct. 20-Oct. 26.* In this week, 157 codes were set in 15 issues. In a clearly rising plateau, eight issues had between nine and 13 codes each; four had 11 codes each. Above the mode, C/YC issues dominate with 25 (nearly 16%), closely followed by Y issues at 20 (nearly 13%); these issues have, respectively, nearly twice as many codes as the highest level plateau issues (MED and C/B) and over twice as many as the lowest plateau issue (P/AR).

The week began with a generally negative piece on *Stateline.org* (10/20/04), but then the campaign seemed to get on track for a day, with release of the long-anticipated economic analysis; broad criticism of state officials for further interference in the electoral process, this time involving voter information materials; and the appearance of well-written pro-Prop. 2 letters and op-ed pieces in most markets. However, it all came tumbling down on Oct. 21 with news of Colin Cotting's murder of his stepmother

while, he claimed, he was high on marijuana. The tragedy could not have come at a better time for opponents of Prop. 2. Anchorage schools' anti-drug "Red Ribbon Week", scheduled to launch on Oct. 22 and led by the Mayor of Anchorage, provided a huge push for opponents without ever mentioning Prop. 2. Y, C/YC, and FX issues were all fed this week by the Cotting murder.

MED issues, along with C/B issues, were at the high end of the plateau with 13 (8%) codes each. Unfortunately, Prop. 2 advocates took a pasting on this front, with pseudo-scientific bunk in several venues going unchallenged, and numerous missed opportunities for presenting credible information, despite a staunch and increasingly polished effort. Also in Week Seven, Drug Counseling & Testing (DC/T) issues began to rise rather sharply; this generally refers to people employed in drug testing or counseling speaking against Prop. 2, with their remarks reported as if they were scientists. No challenges were issued by the press or by Prop. 2 advocates concerning these individuals' economic stake in prohibition. As for the C/B issues, while advocates carried the week on points, so many different types of costs and benefits were mentioned that the message was diffused.

During Week Seven, talk radio programs took up the Prop. 2 debate; advocates were able to hold their own on several through sheer stamina but were mostly outnumbered. Newspaper endorsements also began; interestingly, only the **Peninsula Clarion** (10/24/04) and **FDNM** (10/27/05) got very vitriolic in urging voters to turn down the measure.

AS/I issues scored 22 codes (14%). Among the S/I-related codes, WI, which had lagged behind both D and H/T issues throughout the campaign, seemed to take hold among opposition forces as an especially resonant topic.

9. *Week Eight, Oct. 27-Nov. 2.* In the final week of the campaign, 219 codes were set in 15 issues. Here one of the most interesting transitions of the campaign took place. With a strong modal plateau (eight issues had between ten and 15 codes; four had 11 or 12), Y issues, at 36 codes (16%) continued to outpace others, but C/YC issues dropped to mid-plateau with 12 codes (not quite 5.5%). FX issues, which had been at plateau/low plateau since the run-up, where they scored just above the mode, jumped into third place, with 21 codes (over 9.5%). The perceived link between youth crime, its effects on families, and marijuana, given the external events referenced above, made further mention of youth crime *per se* almost redundant; FX issues had become a code for drug-induced youth violence. C/YC and FX codes together equaled AS/I codes, at 33 each (15%). WI issues alone, which were presented somewhat less stereotypically than D and H/T issues, added 7 codes (just over 4%) to the AS/I total. As it became apparent that Prop. 2 would probably fall short at the polls, more virulence was expressed in attacking it.

MED issues ranked second in Week Eight with 29 codes (over 13%). While making another good showing, Prop. 2 opponents were overwhelmed at the last on this issue, as on others, when the true strength of the opposition was revealed in massive, multi-pronged newspaper advertising campaigns.

10. *Post-Election, Nov. 3-Dec. 2.* Seventy-five codes were assigned in 15 issues. Of these, MED issues predominate, at 13 (over 17%). Four of these, along with four of six F/SR codes and one of eight C/YCs, were generated by coverage of U.S. Supreme Court oral arguments in *Raich v. Ashcroft, et. al.* Interestingly, with the national spotlight off Alaska's marijuana policy, FX issues dropped to the bottom of the list, with only one code (just over 1%). The other previously identified issues spread fairly evenly over two to nine codes each, with no true mode. AS/I codes equal 11 (over 14%), next in importance to MED issues. C/B issues, which Prop. 2 advocates could not get off plateau during the campaign, had nine codes (12%) in the post-election period. No new issues or themes had emerged.

Coverage of election results in various media was interesting for the notes of pride in which the Prop. 2 vote was given, regardless of how the area covered had voted: "In Chugiak-Eagle River, more than 74% shot it down" (**Alaska Star** 11/04/04); "Haines backs pot, Bush, Murkowski" (**Chilkat Valley News** 11/04/04); "Skagway... supports Kerry, Knowles, pot" (**Skagway News** 11/11/04); "We have people voting for both Young and marijuana..."; Dist 35 voters went "against the grain... on 2..." (**Homer News** 11/11/04); "Talkeetna: A Spot of Blue in a Red State" (**Talkeetna Good Times** 11/15/04); "the rest of the state kicked it in the trash can" ("**Voice of the Times**" 11/??/04).

It is worth noting that the general tone of most post-election references is favorable to Prop. 2/legalization advocates. However, given the opposition's well-established pattern of simply not calling attention to itself until needed, proponents must not allow this benign atmosphere to create a false sense that progress has been made.

11. *Finding The Critical Issues.* How may legalization advocates best use their resources at the present time to positively affect the public and media climate in Alaska? In comparing percentages of codes scored by each issue in the three phases of the study period (19. Chart 3), two issues may be identified which:

- a) consistently increased in importance throughout the campaign, and continued to do so into the post-campaign period; and
- b) Prop. 2 advocates believed that they could "win" during the campaign.

These are MED and C/B issues. In addition, P/AR issues, which proponents believed they could win but which actually decreased in importance during the campaign, have now rebounded to levels higher than in the run-up period, the only issue group to do so. F/SR issues, which proponents found both attractive and problematic, and W/I issues, discussed below, are the only issues other than MED and C/B which have seen a steady increase throughout the study period.

The original database references were re-examined, and each code for each of these four issue groups (excluding W/I issues, which we almost all negative and are a tiny part of the overall sample) was given a "plus" (+) or "minus" (-), depending on whether or not it tended to support or oppose legalization arguments. Results are presented below (20. Chart 4).

It will be seen that, of these four issue groups, Prop. 2 advocates "won" only the C/B and P/AR themes, neither of which were decisive in the election. Some discussion and study should be undertaken in order to determine why neither of these issues was as effective as had been hoped (some factors have been indicated here), and, more importantly, how to "ignite" them for media and public consumption.

By contrast, proponents were thoroughly beaten on F/SR issues. The single question most-asked of Prop. 2 advocates was, "How can it work, if marijuana is still illegal under federal law?"; no really satisfactory response was developed, especially regarding taxation! F/SR issues rose to the high plateau in the final week of the campaign, and seemed to be increasing daily. Alaska's dependence on federal funding and military installations is the greatest of any state. Whatever independent postures its citizens may affect, Alaska is firmly in Uncle Sam's pocket. Yet the state's critical oil reserves (now slated for rapid exploitation) give it, in theory, some muscle. Geography, wilderness, and the nation's energy needs also provide a certain ability to thumb the state's nose at far-away Outsiders' rules. It is absurd to think that the federal government will reduce its military presence in Alaska, or funds for roads to get to the oil, because Alaskan adults can smoke pot at home; this point needs to be made firmly by some unimpeachable source (a four-star General would be good!), and repeated as necessary.

Of most concern should be advocates' performance in carrying the critical MED issues. While beginning the campaign well ahead in this area, advocates merely traded shots with opponents for the first five weeks of the campaign, and did not effectively beat back the barrage of nonsensical claims floated by opponents in Weeks Six, Seven, and Eight. This is not at all to disparage the fine work that was done by Prop. 2's spokespersons and advocates; it was simply not enough and too late. Again, opportunities were missed through, in part, a lack of group discussion and process which characterized

Chart 3.

Percentage Comparison in Campaign Stages

Pre-Election Oct. '03-Sept. 7, 2004 (102 codes assigned)			Campaign Proper Sept. 8-Nov. 2, 2004 (597 codes assigned)			Post-Election Nov. 3-Dec. 2, 2004 (75 codes assigned)		
						MED	13	17.3%
C/YC	16	15.6%	(AS/I	91	15.2%)	(AS/I	11	14.6%)
			Y	76	12.7%	C/B	9	12%
Y	12	11.7%						
ODAT	12	11.7%				Y	8	10.6%
(AS/I	12	11.7%)				C/YC	8	10.6%
			MED	57	09.5%	P/AR	7	09.3%
			C/YC	56	09.3%			
P/AR	9	08.8%	O\$	53	08.8%			
			S/I	51	08.5%			
FX	8	07.8%	SO	48	08%	F/SR	6	08%
						O\$	6	08%
			FX	45	07.5%			
			C/B	43	07.2%			
MED	7	06.8%	F/SR	42	07%			
SO	7	06.8%						
C/B	7	06.8%	P/AR	33	05.5%	S/I	4	05.3%
F/SR	6	06.8%	ODAT	29	04.8%			
D	5	04.9%						
S/I	5	04.9%	DC/T	24	04%	SO	3	04%
						ODAT	3	04%
DC/T	4	03.9%				WI	3	04%
			WI	15	02.5%	H/T	2	02.6%
			H/T	13	02.1%	D	2	02.6%
O\$	2	01.9%	D	12	02%			
WI	1	0.95%				FX	1	01.3%
H/T	1	0.95%				DC/T	0	0%

the campaign. For example, a signature ad placed in the final days of the campaign by one of the coalition groups provided the perfect vehicle to refute some of the pseudo-science choking the atmosphere; instead, signatures of medical professionals and academics appeared under a simple statement of support for Prop. 2, no reason given. It is absolutely imperative that legalization advocates, in addition to doctors and university professors, be armed with enough factual information, and access to concise, effective sources such as the NAS/IOM study on cannabis (21.

<http://bob.nap.edu/books/0309071550/html>), to effect a greater groundswell of informed public skepticism for the often-refuted but still-effective scare stories of the prohibitionists. Some materials are already available, through Alaskans for Rights and Revenues, to begin this educational effort; more are needed, and their distribution and dissemination most of all.

Such a program would have the added benefit of knocking one of the main props out from under DC/T issues, which were almost a total loss for Prop. 2 advocates. When "drug counselors" and "drug testers" are put up against real scientists, they lose, and look stupid doing it. The other way to disarm these pretenders is to expose their economic stake in prohibition, which has been publicly denied, and never examined in Alaska.

Two sets of issues are, at this time, clearly the home turf of prohibitionists: C/YC and D. While C/YC issues are the most critical, D issues, as we have seen, contribute significantly to stereotypical views of marijuana users. Both areas are vulnerable to scientific study. Good studies of driving under the influence of cannabis already exist and should be publicized. In addition, these areas are suggested for further research *specific to Alaska*:

- a) hospital admissions related to marijuana;
- b) automobile accidents related to marijuana; and
- c) criminal incidents, especially violent incidents, related to marijuana.

Of course, if marijuana is in a car, or even if a driver has smoked a bowl, that does not mean that an accident was caused by marijuana; the same with criminal actions and hospital admissions. The opposition tosses around a lot of suppositions as fact; this can only be countered, and must be countered, with verifiable facts. Since the Governor is currently pushing for legislation based on our opponents' suppositions, perhaps the Legislature should fund such studies!

In addition, strategies can be developed to "cut the opponents' margins" in areas where the opposition held a clear advantage during the Prop. 2 campaign, specifically Y, WI, FX, and ODAT issues. Of these, the first three are the most important to consider, and may be amenable to some of the same kinds of personalistic approach used by Prop. 2 adversaries. While the illegality of marijuana continues to inhibit public endorsement or discussion, there are ways to approach it; e.g., during the campaign one idea was discussed of TV ads featuring advocates wearing masks, with voices distorted, discussing why it is necessary to hide their identify as well as their experiences as successful parents, business people, professionals, etc. A wide variety of masks, with some echoing Native Alaskan art, would be pretty cool looking, and continue building the Alaskan-based and respectable image for which Prop. 2 began to find some success.

An issue group which is of little or no intrinsic use to legalizers, and also presents little or no danger, is the SO group, as they were mostly manifested here in interference with the initiative process almost from the very beginning. While these are annoying and can leave critical campaign decisions in limbo (e.g., whether the election will be held in August or November!), and, as we have seen, can suck up media attention and campaign resources from issues of more interest, the state's machinations earn it no credit even from the opposition. Opponent Wev Shea called for Lt. Gov. Loren Leman's resignation over his ballot language meddling! And the press and public in general may be more willing to hear

Chart 4.

Positive and Negative Codes for Four Issue Groups

Issue	Pre-Election	Wk 1	Wk 2	Wk 3	Wk 4	Wk 5	Wk 6	Wk 7	Wk 8	Post-Election
MED	+6		+1		+1	+1	+3	+6	+13	+9
	-1		-1		-1	-1	-6	-7	-16	-4
P/AR	+4	+1		+1	+1	+3	+4	+7	+6	+5
	-5					-2	-2	-2	-4	-2
C/B	+4	+1	+1	+1	+1	+4	+2	+11	+10	+5
	-3		-1				-4	-2	-5	-4
F/SR	+1					+1	+3	+1	+5	+5
	-5		-4	-1	-1	-3	-3	-10	-10	-1

the arguments of those who have been treated unfairly by the state. Also, since the SO issues are almost invariably winnable, they can provide an aura of success, and do provide opportunities, at least, to address other themes. On balance, SO issues probably did not significantly affect Prop. 2's outcome other than by distracting advocates from their main tasks. These issues should be anticipated in planning future campaigns, but should not be allowed, in and of themselves, to hog the public discussion as in Week Two of the Prop. 2 campaign.

The other major SO peak, in Week Four, attributable to the Deputy Drug Czar's orchestration of caviling local resolutions, must also be anticipated and planned for. For example, every borough and city councilperson and police official who refused to join in telling voters what to do should be personally thanked and politically acknowledged. Those few candidates for public office who supported Prop. 2 (most notably Thomas Higgins and Jim Sykes), as well as village police officers and state troopers who have spoken out against the marijuana war, should be sought out; will they join legalizers' councils? Opposition officials such as Fairbanks Sen. Gary Wilken should be tagged as errand boys for the *federales* at every opportunity. Ultimately, SO issues are external to a campaign and not under its control, and they do not, probably, sway many votes; they are unavoidable lemons, to be turned, where possible, into lemonade.

The O\$ issue most dreaded by Prop. 2 planners, the large amount of outside funding we would obtain, was of less importance than in it would have been in Alaska's very recent past. The state is being dragged willy-nilly in the 20th century, at least, and many citizens approve. Population growth is not all due to the birth rate; Alaska attracts immigrants, but they are not, perhaps, as adventurous as those who scaled the Chilkoot Pass in the 19th century. A campaign which will have outside funding or staff members should anticipate and prepare for whatever knee-jerk response of isolationism remains, but this theme, while trumpeted by the press and opposition spokesmen, was picked up by only a few voter voices; people are sophisticated enough to realize that television ads cost money, and as long as there is a significant base of Alaskan support, outside support raises few eyebrows. There was more prejudice expressed against "outsiders" by persons within the Prop. 2 organization than by a wide cross-section of voters encountered by this researcher.

The only issues which emerged from the Prop. 2 campaign which should probably be avoided for the foreseeable future are the H/T issues, which lend themselves all too readily to demeaning images and "jokes". If absolutely necessary due to some external event, it should be kept in mind that this is fundamentally a subset of the S/I theme, and responded to by *attacking the stereotype*. For example, marijuana tourists would necessarily not be poor "welfare hippies"; AK bud is not cheap! Eventually, a survey of current Alaska tourists' attitudes toward, and disposable income for, cannabis tourism, might be undertaken by one of the state's hospitality organizations, or an enterprising cruise ship company.

Conclusion. The basic groundwork of public education and organizational development for winning a marijuana legalization initiative is still being defined in Alaska. Sophisticated, timely, and appropriate media strategies for such a campaign, especially in a place as self-consciously unique as Alaska, cannot be prepared by distant advertising firms; nor by inexperienced advocates. If Alaskan legalizers can maintain some consistency of involvement and direction from the Prop. 2 experience, and build upon it and upon succeeding challenges, their level of media expertise will increase. An effort must be made to re-involve the significant base of hemp supporters and to truly set aside past baggage. Some consideration should be made of adopting political techniques which are apparently somewhat unusual in Alaska, such as seeking out organizational endorsements. Official representation from the Alaskan political parties which support legalization should be invited. Cooperative activities, such as musical events, should be planned with groups such as Alaskans for Peace & Justice, and official representation invited from that group. The ideas discussed before the campaign kick-off but impossible to pursue once it began, such as bringing Alaska business and professional people into visible leadership roles and getting their endorsements for ending prohibition now, cannot be postponed if they are to be of value for future use.

The Alaskan media is, in large part, independent and local, to an extent now uncommon in the Lower 48, and open to practices which are also no longer common, e.g., printing verbatim press releases of political organizations. Filling the space, as well as selling the ads, can be problematic for the small press, and interesting, informative, well-written copy can find a home beyond the letters and op-ed columns. These latter are particularly lively in all of the Alaska press surveyed, and consistent efforts to provide interesting, relevant opinion pieces should be an ongoing priority, with each one sent to more than one paper! Campaign spokespersons should meet reporters, editors and publishers, when possible on a casual "background" basis; this can not only help identify and address misconceptions, but build bridges of tolerance and respect across stereotypical divides.

Most importantly, in order to sustain the growth necessary to achieve victory, legalization advocates must develop democratic, inclusive, fiscally reliable organizations which are controlled by Alaskans. They must employ Alaskan artists, wordsmiths, videographers and sound engineers to create their advertising and media campaigns, and build on a basis of unprejudiced examination of those issues where voters must be convinced not only of the validity of legalization arguments, but of their specific worth to Alaska. Outside organizations which wish to support Alaskan legalizers might be advised that their assistance would be best applied to professional leadership and advocacy training, an in-state travel budget, and staff salaries, or to funding specific research needs, rather than to devising ad campaigns, or deciding on legislative priorities, without Alaskan involvement and control.

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Appendix.

1. Figure 2. Pre-Campaign, Campaign, and Post-Election Codes by Issue (Bar Graph).
2. Figure 3. 2004 Alaska Prop. 2 Media Theme Distribution, Final Eight Weeks of Campaign (Line Graph).
3. Chart 5. Pre-Election Tally (699 Codes Assigned). Pre-campaign, and week-by-week distribution of issue codes, ranked numerically. AS/I issues shown separately. Totals for each period. Modal plateaus shown in italics.

Figure 2.




Figure 3.




Chart 5.

Pre-Election Tally (699 Codes Assigned)

TOTAL	Oct. '03-9/7/04	9/8-9/14	9/15-9/21	9/22-9/28	9/29-10/5	10/6-10/12	10/13-10/19	10/20-10/26	10/27-11/2	
rank by total:										
Y	88	12	4	2	0	3	4	7	20	36
C/YC	72	16	0	4	3	3	1	8	25	12
MED	64	7	0	2	0	2	2	9	13	29
S/I	56	5	1	7	2	2	5	6	11	17
O\$	55	2	0	1	1	3	15	10	10	13
SO	55	7	1	1	1	7	2	13	11	12
FX	53	8	0	2	0	3	2	6	11	21
C/B	50	7	1	2	1	1	4	6	13	15
F/SR	48	6	0	4	1	1	4	6	11	15
P/AR	42	9	1	0	1	1	5	6	9	10
ODAT	41	12	0	4	2	0	1	4	7	11
DC/T	28	4	0	1	0	1	2	3	5	12
D	17	5	0	1	0	0	1	3	4	3
WI	16	1	0	1	1	0	0	2	4	7
H/T	14	1	0	0	0	0	2	2	3	6
	699									
AS/I	103	above mode								

rank Oct. '03-9/7/04

C/YC	72	16	0	4	3	3	1	8	25	12
Y	88	12	4	2	0	3	4	7	20	36
ODAT	41	12	0	4	2	0	1	4	7	11
P/AR	42	9	1	0	1	1	5	6	9	10
FX	53	8	0	2	0	3	2	6	11	21
MED	64	7	0	2	0	2	2	9	13	29
SO	55	7	1	1	1	7	2	13	11	12
C/B	50	7	1	2	1	1	4	6	13	15
F/SR	48	6	0	4	1	1	4	6	11	15
D	17	5	0	1	0	0	1	3	4	3
S/I	56	5	1	7	2	2	5	6	11	17
DC/T	28	4	0	1	0	1	2	3	5	12
O\$	55	2	0	1	1	3	15	10	10	13
WI	16	1	0	1	1	0	0	2	4	7
H/T	14	1	0	0	0	0	2	2	3	6
		102								
AS/I		12	above mode							

TOTAL: Oct. '03-9/7/04 9/8-9/14 9/15-9/21 9/22-9/28 9/29-10/5 10/6-10/12 10/13-10/19 10/20-10/26 10/27-11/2

rank first week of campaign:

Y	88	12	4	2	0	3	4	7	20	36
P/AR	42	9	1	0	1	1	5	6	9	10
SO	55	7	1	1	1	7	2	13	11	12
C/B	50	7	1	2	1	1	4	6	13	15
S/I	56	5	1	7	2	2	5	6	11	17
C/YC	72	16	0	4	3	3	1	8	25	12
ODAT	41	12	0	4	2	0	1	4	7	11
FX	53	8	0	2	0	3	2	6	11	21
MED	64	7	0	2	0	2	2	9	13	29
F/SR	48	6	0	4	1	1	4	6	11	15
D	17	5	0	1	0	0	1	3	4	3
DC/T	28	4	0	1	0	1	2	3	5	12
O\$	55	2	0	1	1	3	15	10	10	13
WI	16	1	0	1	1	0	0	2	4	7
H/T	14	1	0	0	0	0	2	2	3	6
			8							
AS/I			1							

rank second week of campaign:

S/I	56	5	1	7	2	2	5	6	11	17
C/YC	72	16	0	4	3	3	1	8	25	12
ODAT	41	12	0	4	2	0	1	4	7	11
F/SR	48	6	0	4	1	1	4	6	11	15
Y	88	12	4	2	0	3	4	7	20	36
C/B	50	7	1	2	1	1	4	6	13	15
FX	53	8	0	2	0	3	2	6	11	21
MED	64	7	0	2	0	2	2	9	13	29
SO	55	7	1	1	1	7	2	13	11	12
D	17	5	0	1	0	0	1	3	4	3
DC/T	28	4	0	1	0	1	2	3	5	12
O\$	55	2	0	1	1	3	15	10	10	13
WI	16	1	0	1	1	0	0	2	4	7
P/AR	42	9	1	0	1	1	5	6	9	10
H/T	14	1	0	0	0	0	2	2	3	6
				32						
AS/I	above mode			9						

TOTAL: Oct. '03-9/7/04 9/8-9/14 9/15-9/21 9/22-9/28 9/29-10/5 10/6-10/12 10/13-10/19 10/20-10/26 10/27-11/2

rank third week of campaign:

C/YC	72	16	0	4	3	3	1	8	25	12
ODAT	41	12	0	4	2	0	1	4	7	11
S/I	56	5	1	7	2	2	5	6	11	17
F/SR	48	6	0	4	1	1	4	6	11	15
C/B	50	7	1	2	1	1	4	6	13	15
SO	55	7	1	1	1	7	2	13	11	12
O\$	55	2	0	1	1	3	15	10	10	13
WI	16	1	0	1	1	0	0	2	4	7
P/AR	42	9	1	0	1	1	5	6	9	10
Y	88	12	4	2	0	3	4	7	20	36
FX	53	8	0	2	0	3	2	6	11	21
MED	64	7	0	2	0	2	2	9	13	29
D	17	5	0	1	0	0	1	3	4	3
DC/T	28	4	0	1	0	1	2	3	5	12
H/T	14	1	0	0	0	0	2	2	3	6
					13					
AS/I	above mode				3					

rank fourth week of campaign:

SO	55	7	1	1	1	7	2	13	11	12
C/YC	72	16	0	4	3	3	1	8	25	12
O\$	55	2	0	1	1	3	15	10	10	13
Y	88	12	4	2	0	3	4	7	20	36
FX	53	8	0	2	0	3	2	6	11	21
S/I	56	5	1	7	2	2	5	6	11	17
MED	64	7	0	2	0	2	2	9	13	29
F/SR	48	6	0	4	1	1	4	6	11	15
C/B	50	7	1	2	1	1	4	6	13	15
DC/T	28	4	0	1	0	1	2	3	5	12
P/AR	42	9	1	0	1	1	5	6	9	10
ODAT	41	12	0	4	2	0	1	4	7	11
WI	16	1	0	1	1	0	0	2	4	7
D	17	5	0	1	0	0	1	3	4	3
H/T	14	1	0	0	0	0	2	2	3	6
						27				
AS/I	below mode					2				

